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FOREWORD

Notwithstanding the end of U.S. basing in the Philippines, a
revised defense framework with Japan, and starts and stops in
Chinese-American military contacts, U.S. security relationships
in the Pacific have enjoyed remarkable continuity since the end of
the Cold War. The United States has promoted, thus far
successfully, its role as the region’s stabilizing power to justify at
home and abroad a sustained Pacific rim presence and
engagement.
Whether this role has staying power for the coming decade is
another matter. The frictions of basing in Japan and Korea, as
well as the anticipated transformation in North Korea, are but
two of a number of emerging challenges to the current U.S.
posture. Concern about future directions of Chinese, or for that
matter Japanese, military power might or might not be sufficient
to smooth such frictions. The early 21st century could see a
reordering of things.
Out from the shadow of the Cold War, most Pacific nations are
reassessing their defense postures. Australia is no exception.
Among the closest of U.S. allies, Australia shares a number of
concerns about potential change in the western Pacific balance. It
is thus natural that the two countries look to their own
cooperative defense relationship for hedges against an uncertain
future. That is the genesis of the current study by Dr. ThomasDurrell Young. Based on his extensive knowledge of Australian
security affairs and recent in-country field work, he examines
prospects for enhancing existing bilateral security ties. He does
so with a sense for the feasible, offering both guiding principles
and practicable approaches that take careful account of the
interests of both nations.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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“ENHANCING” THE AUSTRALIANU.S. DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP:
A GUIDE TO U.S. POLICY

A remarkable aspect of Australian defense policy since
the mid-1970s has been the bipartisan support it has
enjoyed among the three principal national political parties.
Building upon a more modest 1972 white paper, in 1976 the
then-Liberal/National Country Party coalition government
outlined a defense policy based upon self-reliance,
reorienting the Australian Defence Force (ADF) from
operating with allied forces distant from Australia to the
defense of Australia, and the rejection of the use of “threats”
in the defense planning process. 1 Although successive Labor
governments, which enjoyed power between 1983 and 1996,
refined these policies to make them more comprehensive
and sophisticated, in almost every way the defense policy
tenets which emerged from the politico-military catharsis in
Southeast Asia in the early 1970s remained intact.
It is with an understanding of this recent historical
background that one should assess the defense policy
initiatives which have been introduced by the
Liberal/National Party government led by John Howard,
which took power on March 2, 1996. Since coming to office
the Howard government has embarked upon a review of
national strategy, strategic guidance, and force structure
which can only be described as unparalleled by its rapidity
and breadth in modern Australian history. For example, the
Howard government has:
1) established the objective of achieving a closer defense
relationship with the United States;
2) initiated a fundamental review of strategic guidance
to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with a view toward
its reorientation;
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3) encouraged an ongoing effort to study the
reorganization of the Army called for in the previous
government's 1994 defense white paper; and,
4) established the Defence Efficiency Review of the
Department of Defence to identify savings in programs and
practices which could be shifted to expanding the combat
capabilities of the ADF.
As seen by the Howard government's move to implement
the many controversial recommendations of these reviews,
one would have a difficult task constructing a strong
argument that this government is not both sincere and
determined to change aspects of Australia's security policy
and the structure of the ADF. For instance, at the
government's first Australian-United States Ministerial
meeting held in Sydney in July 1996, the Howard
government committed itself to a reinvigoration of the U.S.
security alliance. 2 The government's forthcoming strategic
basis paper could call for the ADF to improve its ability to
engage in power-projection operations in its region and
beyond, in conjunction with Australia's allies. 3 The
government has endorsed key elements of the “Army in the
21st Century Review” which will restructure the Army
within the context of the emerging “revolution in military
affairs” in order to improve its quantitative and qualitative
combat capabilities. 4 And lastly, the government has
endorsed the findings and recommendations of the Defence
Efficiency Review, despite strong protestations from
traditional conservative constituencies, and the Defence
Reform Program envisages to effect a 10 percent shift in
resources away from support activities to improving the
ADF's combat capabilities. 5
In view of these changes in Australian security policy,
two key questions arise. First, what has been the cause of
this sea change in Australia's security and defense policies?
An understanding of the Howard government's defense
initiatives and objectives is essential for U.S. defense
officials in approaching “enhanced” cooperation with
Australia. Second, and following directly from the first
point, how could these policy changes effected by Howard
2

affect Washington's long-term security relationship with
Australia? The purpose of this essay is to proffer a modest
explanation for this change in policy and assess its possible
implications for both Australia and the United States. The
thesis of this essay will be to argue that some of the changes
implemented by Minister for Defence Ian McLachlan are
less significant than they may appear (i.e., willingness to
engage in coalition expeditionary operations) and quite farreaching in others (the Defence Reform Program). Perhaps
most important, however, is the still unaddressed question
of how Canberra and Washington intend to achieve the
objective of “enhancing” an already intimate defense
relationship. “Enhancing” an already close defense
cooperative relationship in a substantive manner that is
beneficial to both countries over the long term could well
prove to be difficult. The essay will conclude with
recommendations to guide U.S. policy, as well as some
specific areas of cooperation for consideration.
Australian Defense Policy: Continuity and Change.
The admixture of the coalition government's public
pronouncements to implement change, while also claiming
to maintain some key long-standing principles of defense
policy, has made ascertaining the exact degree to which the
Howard government will change defense policy a
challenging task indeed. It would appear that these
initiatives are predicated upon an expansion in an already
close defense relationship with the United States. Just as
creating the ADF's ability to defend Australia has been
greatly aided by U.S. military cooperation, 6 so, too, the
Howard government's objective will depend upon achieving
an improved ability to contribute militarily to coalition
efforts. What needs better appreciation is the actual degree
to which the Howard government has moved to change
existing national strategy. As will be argued below, that
which the government has changed is its declared intention
to engage in coalition operations, while aligning the ADF
the better to conduct these type operations, which they have
long undertaken.
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Security Policy. The key assumption which has emerged
to underwrite the Howard government's security policy is
its less than sanguine assessment of East Asia's security
outlook. A similar, but more modest, view was evinced in the
previous Labor government's 1994 defense white paper. 7
Where the Howard government differs with its predecessor
is: 1) the consequent need to forge closer security ties with
the United States (e.g., the “Joint Security Declaration”
issued after the 1996 Australian-United States Ministerial
Meeting),8 and 2) an improved ADF capability to participate
in coalition expeditions to defend common Western
interests, without strict geographic limitations. 9
While still embracing a policy of regional dialogue and
cooperation (e.g., accepting the 1995 “Agreement on
Maintaining Security with Indonesia”), Minister for
Defence Ian McLachlan has argued that the previous
government's policy of regional “Constructive Engagement”
was pursued at the expense of maintaining an effective and
credible defense structure, 10 i.e., an over-emphasis on
regional dialogue, vice maintaining a credible deterrent
capability. Bolstering McLachlan's position, Desmond Ball
has found that by the mid-1980s, military-to-military
contacts between the ADF and its regional counterparts had
reached almost one per week. This situation has had the
negative effect of diverting resources and time from the
ADF's efforts to develop and maintain capabilities suitable
for national defense requirements. 11 In short, dialogue and
contacts, in the Howard government's view, should not be a
replacement for an expanded defense capability which could
be required in a region with a potentially volatile Korean
peninsula and a China, in the words of Paul Dibb, “which
continues to use a muscular approach to international
affairs.”12
Not surprisingly, critics of the government's policies
have been quick to decry these initiatives as a return to an
atavistic policy of “forward defense,” reminiscent of the
1950s and 1960s. “Neo” forward defense, these critics claim,
will make Australia dependent upon allies and will be done
at the expense of maintaining an independent national
4

defense structure. 13 Given that one of the previous Labor
government's achievements in international affairs during
its long tenure was its regional policy of “Constructive
Engagement,” 14 Labor opposition officials have been critical
of a security policy orientation which they see as
deprecating regional ties for a new, but ambiguous
relationship with the United States. No less an authority
than Kim Beazly, head of the opposition, former Minister for
Defence, and an individual with impeccable pro-American
credentials, has argued that the government has over-sold
the U.S. alliance, while damaging ties with regional powers,
like China. 15 Desmond Ball has even argued that the
government has changed defense policy without explaining
it to the nation and has initiated a course of action which
will spell the end of the policy of self-reliance. 16 Minister for
Defence McLachlan has responded to these criticisms by
strongly denying the government was resurrecting a
forward defense strategy. 17
Defense Policy. In assessing exactly what the intention
and implications of the coalition government's security
policies are, it would appear that they promise to have the
most important impact on the linkage between security and
defense policies, in particular as they relate to force
development. Paul Dibb presciently wrote in the early
months of the new government that “The main deficiency
that the Howard Government identifies in the Keating
government's 1994 Defence White Paper is the mismatch
between its strategic guidance and the lack of a blueprint for
defence reform.” 18 Dibb's observation is reflected in
Minister McLachlan's statement that the government
wants to be “an active participant, not just a spectator” in
international affairs. 19 In fact, such an ambitious policy is
not that dissimilar from the practice of previous Labor
governments of sending the ADF well outside of Labor's
established “area of direct military interest.” 20 By no means
can one argue that Somalia, Rwanda, or the Persian Gulf
are within Australia's immediate geographic area; yet it
was for the defense of Australia that the Labor government
directed the ADF to be structured. 21 In short, the longstanding policy that the ADF be structured and equipped
5

solely for the defense of Australia has been abandoned by
the new government. To continue McLachlan's argument,
“A narrow perspective on Australia's security focused solely
on continental defence would sell us short.” 22
Thus, the current writer is of the view that the Howard
government's most significant departure from past defense
policies is its objective to align its directives for force
development with the ADF's likely missions, i.e., improved
combined interoperability. In other words, the government
wants to have better options when contemplating
contributing forces to coalitions. Whether this is indeed a
departure from the “policy” of self-reliance could be simply a
matter of semantics. 23 While perhaps a contentious
interpretation, it would appear that the most important
impact of “self-reliance” by Australian governments has
been the discipline it has had on forcing the individual
services and HQADF to develop forces which are capable of
conducting joint operations, optimally suited for responding
to low-level and short-warning contingencies in the defense
of Australia. 24 But important shortcomings remain, in
terms of the ADF's ability to conduct independent
operations in the defense of Australia, which cast serious
doubt whether “self-reliance” should continue to direct the
ADF's force development. 25
In a sharp departure from the previous government's
“steady as she goes” approach to defense structure, to quote
Steward Woodman, 26 the Howard government has moved to
increase the combat capabilities of the ADF, either in the
defense of Australia or within a coalition in the following
ways. First, albeit an initiative of the Keating government
in its 1994 Defence White Paper, 27 the government
continued the review of the structure of the Australian
Army. The resulting report, “The Army in the 21st
Century,” provided the basis for the subsequent plan,
“Restructuring of the Australian Army.” 28 The government
has endorsed the reorganization of the regular and reserve
elements to improve the army's combat capability and
ability to deploy within, and outside, Australia. What is
remarkable is that this restructuring will be along new
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organizational lines (self-contained Joint Task Forces)
which has brought the government into conflict with some of
its traditional conservative supporters, e.g., the Returned
Services League. 29
Second, the Defence Reform Program was launched by
the government because of its inability, for financial
considerations, to expand the defense budget. 3 0 In
consequence, in order to expand the ADF's combat
capabilities, it was necessary to conduct a review of current
management practices and programs in defense to identify
areas for redundancy. In endorsing the findings of the DER,
the government anticipates saving approximately one
billion Australian dollars ($A) 31 or some 10 percent of the
current Defence budget 32 which can be shifted to expanding
the ADF's combat capabilities. 33 Again, the endorsement of
the DER's recommendations (some which are quite
draconian) 34 has not been done without domestic political
cost.
In Sum. In terms of policy change it is clear that the
Howard government has initiated a series of far-reaching
policy changes and reforms with the objective of expanding
the combat capabilities of the ADF. As regards continuity,
the government has arguably built upon some longstanding defense policies. The most significant area of
change is in the government's envisaged employment of
ADF, i.e., an external, vice solely continental, application.
Whereas the Hawke and Keating Labor governments (from
1983-1996) proved themselves not at all ill disposed at
contradicting their own self-imposed limitations in their
numerous extra-regional deployments of the ADF, the
Howard government's a priori acknowledgement of its
intention to participate in such deployments appears to
have become the most rancorous point of dispute causing an
apparent end of bipartisanship in defense policy. 35
Perhaps after the government has issued a defense
white paper outlining and compiling all of its reforms and
objectives, then the stage will be set for a formal national
strategy debate. Only after such a process can one can hope
to see a coalescing of views recreating a bipartisan
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understanding on defense. One would hope that the
government's emphasis on enhancing bilateral defense
cooperation with the United States will not become a topic of
domestic political debate. 36 However, unless the Howard
government and the United States fulfill their commitment
to “enhance” the existing relationship and explain these
new initiatives to the opposition, Canberra runs the risk of
encouraging an unintended and possibly uninformed
debate over the value of the U.S. alliance in the new
strategic environment.
“Enhanced” Defense Cooperation: Defining the
Issue.
Irrespective of whether one accepts Kim Beazley's
aforementioned criticism that the Howard government has
over-sold the U.S. alliance, the fact remains that the current
government is now in the position of expanding the defense
relationship with the United States. Failing this, the
Howard government could find itself in the difficult position
of having only met one aspect of its policy; i.e., improving the
ability to deploy the ADF, but without a closer defense
relationship with the United States for which the ADF is
being restructured. To be sure, given the already longstanding close bilateral defense relationship, 37 the ADF
essentially already has the capability to support the
government's policy. Yet, given that the government has
stated that it intends to “enhance” the bilateral defense
relationship, the government could well be challenged by
the opposition to identify where it has expanded the
relationship and explain how this has improved Australian
security.
To date, the only substantive initiative for which the
government can claim credit is the release of the “Joint
Security Declaration” following the 1996 Australian-U.S.
Ministerial Meeting held in Sydney. Outside of the
announcement reaffirming the continued 10-year operation
of the Joint Facility at Pine Gap and the announcement of
new arrangements to replace the closing of the Joint
Defence Facility at Nurrungar around 2000, 38 the greatest
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attention in Australia has been directed toward the
document's statement that Australia will “provide
additional training opportunities for United States Forces.”
Unique for such a high level communique, a specific
exercise, TANDEM THRUST 97, was mentioned as a
manifestation of closer defense ties. In reality, of course,
this exercise had been planned long before the Howard
government came to power.
Probably the most important aspect of the Joint Security
Declaration is the simple fact that both counties signalled
that, notwithstanding the altered Asia-Pacific security
environment, the bilateral security and defense relationship remained central to both countries “. . . because it
reflects fundamental shared interests and objectives.”
Whereas some might opine that this merely states the
obvious, the statement that the security relationship has
transcended the end of the Cold War is not without
significance. The crucial, if indeed, implied point in this
joint statement is that the long-standing close defense
relationship will be continued. And in this respect, what
must be one of the most important aspects fostered by this
relationship has been what it allows both countries' defense
forces to undertake.
However, the operative word, “allowed,” is not without
an important problem it portends for both countries as they
work to “enhance” the defense relationship. The simple
problem, if one so desires to characterize it as such, is that
since 1951 both countries' armed forces have developed
extensive cooperative ties among themselves, not to
mention their respective departments of defense. 39 It was
not with hyperbole that in 1987 a U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense characterized the extensive defense
relationship among the ANZUS partners which developed
out of the 1951 treaty as “nearly unique in the U.S.
experience.” 40 In short, just as there are sound rationales for
existing bilateral defense ties, there are reasons (which
have been regularly revisited over the years) why both do
not cooperatively engage in some other areas.
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Thus, the question which both countries must now
address is exactly where could and should defense
cooperation be expanded? Given the value that both
countries place on the relationship, a major consideration
must be that initiatives “enhancing” the existing relationship not contain controversial provisions which could
have negative reactions on long-standing, mutually
beneficial ties. The Joint Security Declaration specifically
identified the continued operation of the Joint Space
Facility at Pine Gap and Australia's decision to provide
additional training opportunities as manifestations of the
“enhanced” defense relationship. As the particulars related
to the former are classified, one is left to ponder the wisdom
of a greater number of U.S. “training opportunities” in
Australia. After all, in view of the wide press coverage in
Australia given to the TANDEM THRUST 97 exercise, 41 it
would appear that “exercises” are seen by the Howard
government as an important manifestation of this
“enhanced” defense relationship. However, a review of the
facts surrounding the issue of increasing U.S. exercise
tempo in Australia is more problematic than it may appear
at first blush.
Exercises in Australia: Problematic Aspects.
As a general observation, existing ground exercise areas
in Australia are already being used to their maximum
extent, or suffer from so many physical and infrastructure
limitations as to make their use of little value. Although the
ADF has made a considerable effort to open up exercise
areas for use by the U.S. armed forces, a confluence of
factors will limit Washington's ability to expand its exercise
series in Australia. 42
There are three (some of which are immutable) factors
that limit field exercises in Australia. 43
1) Existing suitable exercise areas are already being
used to capacity. Indeed, an environmental impact
exception had to be made to conduct TANDEM THRUST 97
at Shoalwater Bay, Queensland. Environmentalists have
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expressed concern regarding the over-use of this area,
which is located in the Great Barrier Reef Maritime Park.
Clearly, the United States should not anticipate such
exceptions in future.
2) During the wet season in the north (November
through April), it is not feasible to conduct field exercises.
Ground movements are restricted to sealed roads, of which
there are few in the north, and even they are subject to
wash-outs.
3) The north is an inhospitable region, which explains
the small population and limited civil infrastructure.
Extreme heat, oppressive humidity during the lead up to
the wet season, dust, bush fires, massive numbers of flies,
and the ubiquitous presence of severely misanthropic
saltwater crocodiles in coastal waters, estuaries, and rivers
well inland (i.e., 100 kilometers), all make operating in the
north difficult. Naval operations are also limited in coastal
waters because of massive tidal ranges and incomplete
hydrographic surveys outside of high traffic sea lanes.
As difficult as it may be to understand or accept, there
are actually few areas in Australia where the ADF can
exercise. Although the north and northwest of the country
appear desolate and uninhabited, these areas are privately
owned or rented long term from the government. The
region's extreme environmental fragility is strictly
protected by Australian federal and state laws, which
severely limit repeated use. In the Northern Territory,
where there are large pasturage tracks, the ADF has been
forced to obtain permission to use private lands to deploy to
exercise areas and given the increased tempo of ADF
exercises there, some land owners are becoming less willing
to allow access. Yet another limiting factor is the presence of
many Aboriginal sacred sites which are federally protected.
A final complication to exercising in the north of
Australia is the Northern Territory government in Darwin.
Albeit there is wide-spread and deep-felt affection for the
United States in the Northern Territory (due in large part to
the role played by the United States in the defense of the
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north during the Second World War), the Territorial
government sees “defense,” either Australian or foreign, as
a needed economic boon. Yet, the north has limited
infrastructure and even less industrial capacity to support
the ADF, let alone visiting U.S. and Singaporian forces.
Most importantly, it would be inaccurate to assume that the
Territorial affection for visiting forces exercising in the
north is shared by the Australian populace to the southeast.
Indeed, as the ADF and foreign forces increase their
exercise and training presence in the north, there has been
an increase in public criticism in Darwin of the stationing
and temporary presence of military forces.
As a result of the July 1996 Australian-U.S. Ministerial
Meeting and the ADF's shift to the north, new and old areas
are being developed and/or considered for exercises by the
ADF. However, just as there are a number of general
limiting factors concerning exercises in Australia, so are
there specific restrictions. One shared both by Bradshaw
and Yampi Sound is that they are located within heavily
used civil air corridors.
Bradshaw Station. The former Bradshaw Station in the
Northern Territory has recently been purchased by the
Australian Department of Defence. It is approximately 600
kilometers from Darwin by road. Bradshaw's mission will
be to support 1st Brigade which is moving to Palmerston,
NT from Holsworthy, NSW. The area comprises 1 million
acres, is located between the Fitzmorris and Victoria rivers
and is reputed to have good training terrain. The area has
sea, air and land access. The ADF will have to upgrade
existing infrastructure in the area (estimated to be $A50
million), and the Commonwealth will need to improve
infrastructure leading to the area, which it has been slow to
plan, according the Northern Territory government.
Improvements include new sealed roads, simulation
systems, construction/improvement of three airstrips which
can operate C-130s, and three training camps similar to
that being constructed at Mt. Bundi, southeast of Darwin.
These improvements must be effected before the area can be
used–current projections are that it will be ready in 1999.
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Of fundamental ADF concern regarding Bradshaw is
that, despite its size, Bradshaw may not be sufficient for 1st
Brigade's training requirements. A key inhibiting factor is
the area's extreme environmental fragility. For example, it
can take up to 10-years for the terrain to return to its normal
state after it has been crossed by an armored tracked
vehicle. As 1st Brigade is the test bed for new operational
and organizational concepts which will affect the entire
Army as outlined in “Army 21,” it is predictable that the
area's usage will be severely restricted to outside forces.
Yampi Sound Defense Training Area.44 Yampi is located
approximately 130 kilometers by highway/minor sealed
road northwest of Derby, Western Australia. Defense
officials claim that the Department of Defence purchased
this area in the mid-1970s without a survey, let alone a visit
by ADF personal to ascertain if it were suitable for
exercises. One-third of the area is suitable for dismounted
maneuver.
Yampi's limitations are formidable. It is located within
the cyclone belt. There is only one limited sealed road from
the Gibb River Road from Derby, but that only gives access
to Oobagooma in the southwest of the range. This access
road is currently prone to wash-outs. There is no cross
country driving ability. Defense infrastructure development is essentially nonexistent. From the 1970s until
recently, the range has only been used by reserve Regional
Surveillance Force Units and the Special Air Service
Regiment. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based at Robertson
Barracks, deployed to the range in 1994. Following this
deployment, the Australian Army determined that the area
was unsuitable for mechanized operations. Amphibious
operations are difficult due to extreme tidal ranges and the
lack of suitable hydrographic surveys. Tidal ranges are so
severe as to require ships to stand seven miles off shore to
conduct naval gun fire support. Due to the area's
unsuitability for ADF exercises, the Australian Army
determined the requirement to purchase a new range which
led the purchase of Bradshaw Station.
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Delamere Air Weapons Range. Located 80 nautical miles
southwest of RAAF Base Tindal (which itself is 330
kilometers south of Darwin), is the RAAF's principal air
weapons range. Delamere is approximately one-half million
acres (approximately 30 miles by 40 miles). It has the
advantage of having no significant environmental
limitations and is located well outside of the cyclone belt. On
the downside, the RAAF finds its flat terrain a limit to
training. The RAAF is planning to expand the range by
purchasing the rest of the Delamere Station. The Department of Defence has not yet endorsed the concept and the
RAAF is considering going alone as did the army in pressing
for the purchase of Bradshaw. The RAAF's reluctance in the
early 1990s to having U.S. aircraft using RAAF Base Tindal
and Delamere has softened markedly. Senior RAAF Base
Tindal leadership stated that U.S. access and usage are
welcome, Australian resource limitations considered.
In Sum. At present, there is some expansion capacity for
training exercises in Northern Australia, notwithstanding
a variety of significant limitations:
1) Environmental concerns and restrictions will increase
as training exercises in the region grow.
2) Civil infrastructure development continues to lag
behind the development of defense training areas.
3) U.S. training exercises must not exceed the ability of
the ADF to participate and they must be seen as useful to
Australia.
4) Civil-military relations in Northern Australia are in a
state of transition to where military activities are becoming
less welcome than in the past. 45
“Enhanced” Defense Cooperation: Opportunities.
The constraints which will confront increased training
opportunities by U.S. armed forces in Australia, while
formidable, should not be construed as obviating any
possibility for growth in existing operations tempo. Rather,
what political officials in both countries need to appreciate
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is the fact that increasing U.S. exercises could come at a cost
to the ADF. This can be expressed in terms of the limited
time made available to the ADF on their own ranges, as well
as in what one senior ADF official privately described as the
force's exercise overload. Because of the intensive militaryto-military program with Southeast Asian states, in
addition to regularly scheduled maneuvers with the United
States, the ADF, according to one Australian official, is
becoming “over-exercised, but under-trained.” When
combined with the simple geographic fact that Australia is
not well-located to U.S. forces forward deployed in the
Northwest Pacific, and the high costs involved in transporting them and their equipment to Australia for training
opportunities, it would be injudicious for either country to
make a greater number of exercises as the principal
embodiment of enhanced defense relations.
In light of these restrictions on expanding combined
exercises in Australia, it is evident that other areas of
cooperation should be explored, in addition to the matter of
exercises. Clearly, future cooperation should not be limited
to what has been successful in the past; but remaining
mindful of past successes and failures could be helpful in
identifying future initiatives. In reviewing the record of
bilateral defense cooperation, three principles emerge
which should be considered when assessing new
initiatives: 46
1) Mutually beneficial. From the perspective of Australia
with its limited defense budget and already stretched
exercise schedule, any new initiatives for cooperation need
to pass the test of benefiting both countries. Cooperation
should not come to be seen as constituting a burden to
defense forces and/or without value to either Australia or
the United States.
2) Avoidance of incongruent linkages. Related to the
issue of mutually beneficial cooperation is the matter of
ensuring that new cooperative initiatives do not create
disjointed cooperation. In defense cooperation to date there
has largely been a direct linkage between the mutual
benefits each side has received from each activity. The
15

creation of incongruent cooperation could develop into
partisan political issues and, therefore, become detrimental
to the relationship. It is instructive to note that Australian
concerns in the 1960s and early 1970s over the presence of
sensitive U.S. communications facilities in Australia were
largely mitigated by the creation of the Defense-to-Defense
Talks, which enabled Australian defense officials the better
to understand the relevance of these facilities in the
strategic balance. 47
3) Pay to play. U.S. legislation regarding defense
cooperation with formal allies which are economically
developed is very clear on this point: they must pay for any
assistance they receive. Australia has long recognized this
reality and, therefore, procures equipment through FMS
cases.48 If training aids/facilities are required for U.S. forces
on Australian ranges, then the United States must be
prepared to pay for them. Although the international
security environment has changed since the enactment of
this U.S. legislation, continuing this principle would
insulate the relationship from political criticism and a
destructive burden-sharing debate.
There follows a list of possible areas for new defense
cooperation. It is not intended to be comprehensive, but
rather these proposals should be seen as merely a selection
for consideration and which meet the principles outlined
above.
1) Ascertaining the state of defense ties. The defense
relationship that has evolved between the two countries has
done so in a very decentralized manner. There is no
standing secretariat that manages defense cooperation;
oversight is provided by a large number of meetings
between defense and service officials. As a result, the exact
extent of defense cooperation is not well-known,
particularly to American defense officials, nor is it properly
documented. In consequence, the most important step
toward “enhancing” the defense relationship would be to
establish a small ad hoc working group of Australian and
U.S. defense experts to establish a base line document
which assesses the current state of defense cooperative
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activities and programs. With this in hand, the group
should then review cases where cooperation has not been
successful, as the time for such initiatives may now be more
fortuitous, determine where additional cooperation could be
relevant, and where existing oversight arrangements could
be improved.
2) Combined and joint exercises. There is scope for a
slight increase in the tempo of training exercises. However,
political, environmental, financial, and logistical realities
will mitigate against a substantive increase in exercises. In
view of all the factors related to this complex issue, a
deliberative and coordinated approach to this matter
between the respective departments of defense will ensure
that long-term interests of both parties are protected from
short-term political expediencies.
3) Revolution in military affairs. Australia is one of
America's few Western allies that has embraced, in part, the
concept of the revolution in military affairs, as well as
finding funding to support forward-looking initiatives. The
Australian Army under the “Army 21st Century Review”
plan will be restructured from its previous division-based
organization to one that employs Joint Task Forces which
are self-contained. This new structure should enable the
army the better to defend Australia, as well as to develop
greater versatility to undertake a wider range of operations,
ranging from low- to high-intensity. It is very likely that the
other two services will undertake similar reviews in the
near future. These restructuring efforts, combined, will be
based upon exploiting new information technologies.
Although the Australian defense procurement budget is
modest, it is clear that the ADF is intent upon exploiting
new technologies and experimenting with new (and less
expensive) concepts and organizations as it restructures
and reorganizes. 49 Thus, there is an opportunity for the U.S.
armed forces to engage in mutually advantageous
cooperation related to the revolution in military affairs.
4) Coalition warfare. Related to the revolution in
military affairs is the issue of future coalition warfare. That
Australia has been a stalwart ally to the United States in
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this century there is no question, nor is there any indication
that this will not continue into the 21st century. 50 There is
an opportunity for the United States to capitalize on the
new defense relationships Canberra has assiduously built
with regional states, particularly their military forces. In
many cases, the ADF enjoys a closer working relationship
with its regional neighbors than the U.S. armed forces. As it
would seem judicious to assume that the United States can
rely upon Australia to support it in times of international
crisis, as well as contribute forces to Western coalitions, it
would make sense to assist the ADF in introducing
interoperable revolution in military affairs technologies,
concepts and organizational structures. This would enable
the ADF to operate effectively with the U.S. armed forces, as
well as enabling the ADF to serve as a conduit between less
technologically-advanced East Asian military forces and
their U.S. counterparts.
5) Wargaming and simulations. Given the financial and
physical challenges that exercises present to the ADF, for
the past few years the Australian Defence Force
Warfighting Centre has been given the responsibility to
improve the ADF's wargaming and simulations
capabilities. The ADF has reviewed U.S. capabilities and
would like greater cooperation and assistance. Thus, there
may be room for future cooperation and division of
responsibilities.
6) Consultations. Since the late 1980s, Australia has
moved in a significant way to improve its relationships with
regional neighbors. In contrast with Canberra's previous
reputation in the region, Australian officials and analysts
have excellent professional and private access to senior
regional defense leaders. Indeed, the ADF has been in the
forefront of making and maintaining Australian special
access in the region. While a political boon to Australia, this
has been at the cost of maintaining an expensive bilateral
training and exercise program with regional states. Given
Australia's access and expertise in the region, it would make
eminent sense to ensure there is closer coordination with
Canberra of U.S. defense activities in the region.
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It must be noted that the initiatives suggested above are
far from being headline-grabbing manifestations one might
associate with a more muscular defense relationship.
Nonetheless, what they do represent are some substantive
recommendations with potential long-term benefits for both
countries' defense postures. While exercises like TANDEM
THRUST 97, the largest combined and joint exercise held in
Australia in 20 years, are indeed observable evidence of
heightened defense cooperation, more tangible and
valuable representations of cooperation are not necessarily
easily manipulated into press sound-bites.
Conclusion.
There can be little question that the Australian
government under John Howard has substantively changed
a key aspect of Australia's security policy. The LiberalNational Party coalition government has made it perfectly
clear that it will participate in the defense of Western ideals
and interests, irrespective of their location. In consequence,
two important implications follow. First, the ADF will be
restructured to enhance its capabilities for participation in
power projection missions. Its combat capabilities will be
augmented by a shift in resources from support activities
and programs toward expanding and improving combat
forces. Second, the government has stated its intention of
enhancing Australia's long-standing security relationship
with the United States. Lacking at this point is a blueprint
expounding how the bilateral defense relationship is to be
expanded.
Also lacking is a national strategy debate in Australia.
Given the changes the government has effected in terms of
defense policy, one could expect an intense debate in
Australia over the government's new security and defense
initiatives. It is essential that this debate take place so that
one would hope to see a coalescing of a new bipartisan
approach to defense. However, before this can be expected to
come to pass, one could assume that the Labor Party will
want the government's defense policy and its objectives
explained, particularly how defense ties with the United
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States will be “enhanced.” For the Howard government to
stay accusations that it is over-selling the American
alliance, a systematic outline of how the relationship will be
expanded and an explanation of how it will benefit
Australian security will be required. Without such a
statement, the government runs the risk of politicizing the
U.S. alliance, with all of the attending destructive
consequences therein.
And it is surely the reemergence of a strong element of
bipartisanship in defense policy that the United States
would like to see develop. Washington will assuredly
applaud efforts on the part of Canberra to expand the
combat capabilities of the ADF, either for the defense of
Australia or for power projection missions. But one must be
aware of the fact that Washington enjoyed very close
defense ties with the previous Labor governments and
supported their efforts to improve the ADF's ability to
defend Australia. Washington, over the years, has proven
itself capable, therefore, of accepting and working with
whatever defense policy Canberra determines best meets
its national objectives and interests.
If there is a point that both countries should have
extreme reservations about transgressing, it is in the value
they place on maintaining defense cooperation. This “nearly
unique relationship” has heretofore proven itself capable of
transcending the vicissitudes of the odd diplomatic
contretemps between Washington and Canberra. Indeed,
defense relations have even grown closer during such
periods51 and have continued to grow despite the lack of
identifiable threats to Australia's immediate national
security. The reason for this, as stated in the Joint Security
Declaration, is that the relationship “. . . reflects
fundamental shared interests and objectives.” Such a
closeness in views and interests has served as the means
where cooperation has reached its current level of intimacy.
Therefore, perhaps the most sagacious principle the
Howard government and Clinton administration should
follow in exploring close defense ties is adherence to
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Hippocrates's admonition to physicians, “First to do no
harm.”
Recommendations.
1) U.S. Department of Defense should take very
seriously indeed the Howard government's objective of
achieving closer defense cooperative relations.
2) U.S. Department of Defense should not unilaterally
recommend to Australian Department of Defense any
specific defense cooperative initiatives at this time. To do so
places the onus on the United States to divine what the
Australians might find acceptable.
3) Rather, U.S. Department of Defense should suggest to
Australian Department of Defence creating a small ad hoc
bilateral working group of politico-military experts to:
a) establish a base line document ascertaining the
current state of defense cooperative activities and
programs;
b) review cases where cooperation has not been
successful with a view toward revisiting such initiatives;
c) ascertain from respective services and defense
agencies where additional cooperation could be relevant in
the new security environment; and,
d) identify where existing defense cooperation
oversight procedures/arrangements can be improved and/or
expanded.
4) New initiatives should adhere to the principles of:
a) being mutually beneficial;
b) avoiding of incongruent linkages; and,
c) paying to play.
5) Specific areas which should be considered for
“enhanced” cooperation include:
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a) additional combined/joint exercises as ascertained
by departments of defense as being in the best interest of
both countries;
b) revolution in military affairs-related R & D initiatives, to include their testing and evaluation;
c) revolution in military affairs technology as it may
be applicable to ensuring that the ADF could provide a
linkage in interoperability between the U.S. armed forces
and Australia's regional states in coalition warfare/peace
operations;
d) wargaming and simulation; and,
e) enhanced consultation to improve the coordination
of both countries’ defense activities in the Far East.
6) U.S. Department of Defense should suggest to
Australian Department of Defence improving bilateral
defense coordination arrangements to include one of the
following options:
a) posting of an American defense official in
Department of Defence in Canberra with the mission of
coordinating and overseeing expanded cooperation and
ensuring daily management. In the Australian case, the
Head of Australian Defence Staff already fulfills that role in
Washington. Enhanced defense relations with Australia
should be balanced with centralized U.S. Department of
Defense oversight and management.
b) emulating the standing Canada-United States
Military Cooperation Committee (preferably located in
Canberra, vice Washington) to provide working level
oversight in Washington of increased defense cooperation.
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